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本文聚焦于对低保对象管理问题进行探讨，以找出问题症结并提出相关对策。      
本文共五章：   
第一章为导论，介绍了研究背景、相关研究综述以及本文研究思路和框架。           
第二章介绍了信息经济学关于逆向选择及道德风险的理论，并分别分析其
在城市 低生活保障中的具体表现，如“假低保”；“不合理开支”，“隐性就业”，




























The CPC Central Committee' s Decision of Some Important Issues on Building 
a Socialist Harmonious Society Mentions that，we should strengthen the building of 
systems and maintain fairness and justice, and make them as one of the important 
tasks in building of a socialist harmonious society. We should strengthen the aid 
toward the people in difficulty as well as perfect the social security. So this paper 
makes the urban minimum living guarantee as the theme and talks about the 
management problem of the object in urban minimum living guarantee. While 
current urban minimum living guarantee system is guaranteeing the basic life level 
of poor group, it also faces how to go out of the plight caused by moral hazard. 
Inherent information asymmetric, plus of policy defect, all leads to the lack of 
coping mechanisms toward the adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper tries 
to analyze the mechanisms in minimum livelihood guarantee system for urban, and 
proposes the measure as well as find out the reasons of problem. 
This paper can be divided into five parts. 
The first part introduces research background, summary and framework. 
The second part introduces the theory about adverse selection and moral hazard 
in Information Economics, and analyzes their performance in minimal assurance, 
such as "false minimal assurance", "hidden employment", "lazy person in minimal 
assurance", and so on. 
The third part analyzes the reasons from theoretical and practical level. It thinks 
that violations in the minimal assurance can be attributed to game acts and acts of 
hitchhiking by rational economic men under condition of information asymmetric, as 
well as helplessness choices by poor who lacks of human and social capital in 
support. At the meantime, it analyzes the efficiency affected by target management 
issues. 













Kong and Dalian city inland, to summarize the management experience in minimal 
assurance system. 
The fifth part proposes the "Path of Participatory Governance". And then 
analyzes how to avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The paper's main innovation is that it analyzes the problem as well as reasons of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in the urban minimum living guarantee with 
Information Economics. Following path of law-system-organization-professional   
-group, it proposes the countermeasures. As limit of the professional knowledge, the 
research method of the paper is partial characterization. And research of some 
problem is to be further clear. 
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一、导  论 
  1





低生活保障工作，对于促进社会稳定和各项事业健康发展有着至关重要的作用。       




































如 2006 年河南省用 3 个月的时间开展了对全省所有城市低保对象的资格复核，


















































出来。    
从理论研究来看，由于城市 低生活保障和城市贫困问题紧密结合在一起，
有关低保问题的研究呈现出三种分析方式：其一，仅在致贫原因或脱贫对策中提

































































































































图 1: 本文的分析框架 
一、导论 
 



























     假低保混入体系 
  真低保受排斥 
 
    
2.道德风险行为 
     不合理开支 
     隐性就业 
    “巧”对动态管理 
     选择主动失业 








































低生活保障中的表现。                       













































表 1: 信息经济学基本模型分类 




事后（ex post） 隐藏信息的道德风险 隐藏行动的道德风险 
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